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Abstract
Existing theories explaining security price clustering as well as clustering in the retail deposit
and mortgage markets are incompatible with the clustering in the corporate loan market. We
develop a new theoretical model that the attitude of the lender toward the uncertainty about
the quality of the borrower leads to the clustering of spreads. Our empirical results support our
theoretical model and we find that clustering increases with the degree of uncertainty between
the lender and the borrower. In contrast, clustering is less likely when the uncertainty about
the quality of the borrower has been reduced through repeated access and through prior
interactions of the lender and the borrower.
Keywords: corporate loans, interest rate clustering, information asymmetry, uncertainty
JEL Classification: D49, D82, G12, G21
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence on the clustering of security prices is abundant. This strand of literature shows
that the security prices tend to cluster around integers more frequently than half integers and half
integers are more frequent than quarter integers and quarter integers are more frequent than one-
eighth (Niederhoffer, 1966; Harris, 1991; Christie and Schulz, 1994; Ikenberry and Weston, 2007;
Ishii, 2014). A couple of studies, both theoretically and empirically, also look at the clustering of
interest rates in the retail banking markets (Kahn et al., 1999; Ashton and Hudson, 2008). There
∗The authors would like to thank the associate editor and two anonymous referees for their very helpful sugges-
tions and remarks.
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is hardly any study looking at the clustering of spreads in the corporate loan market.1 In this
paper, we develop a theory on the clustering of interest rate spreads in the corporate loan market
because existing theories like negotiation hypothesis, tacit collusion hypothesis and limited recall
model fail to answer clustering of spreads in this market. Our empirical data provide support to
our theoretical argument that corporate loan spreads offered to corporate borrowers are clustered.
This phenomenon is evident from Figure 1.
We specifically answer the following question in this paper: Why do corporate loan spreads
cluster? The above mentioned facts clearly show that the clustering is an imperfection in the
lending market. Given this friction, the interesting question is to disentangle whether the lender
is: Extracting rents from the imperfection or being compensated for risk and/or uncertainty. To
answer these questions, we provide a new theoretical argument by introducing decision making
under uncertainty into the model given by Chatterjee and Lee (1998). We reckon, in the corporate
loan market, lenders offer rounded spreads to borrowers who are unable to fully reveal their infor-
mation to the lenders. Under such circumstances, instead of exerting extra efforts to exactly know
their affairs, the lenders offer a single rate to a group of such borrowers. These rates are rounded
more frequently at a multiple of 25 basis points.
Chatterjee and Lee (1998) study a bargaining model where there is one seller and one buyer
with an outside option. They consider a two-period game theoretic model. In the first period the
seller offers a price, then the buyer can either accept, reject or search in the market to find another
price. If the buyer accepts the first offer, the game ends, otherwise it continues to the next period.
In the second period, the buyer may search in the market for a new price while the outside option
cannot be credibly communicated. Chatterjee and Lee (1998) derive the equilibrium by backward
induction for buyers with different search costs. Their results show that when the search cost is
high enough, the game ends immediately, otherwise they continue to the second period. We base
our argument on Chatterjee and Lee (1998) and adapt it to the lender and borrower setting with
two main differences. First, in our model the borrowers vary not only in the search cost, but also in
the probability of getting an outside offer. This probability reflects the quality (which is referred as
‘type’ in our model) of the borrower. If two borrowers are from the same quality they are classified
as from the same type. Second, we assume that the lender may not have full information on the
quality of the borrower, which causes uncertainty in the model. To study this model, we resort to
the literature on decision making under uncertainty.
We argue that the lender’s attitude toward uncertainty about the quality of the borrower leads
to clustering of interest rate spreads. We show that it is best for the lender to offer search-
deterring rate to high quality borrowers2. Since the type of such borrowers is known to the lender,
it is possible for the lender to derive the rate that stops the borrowers from searching in the market
so that they accept the offer immediately. In other words, for every type of high quality borrower,
there is an optimal rate that can be offered. Therefore, the rate offered to the high quality borrower
is not clustered. On the other hand, for the low quality borrowers due to information asymmetry,
1Except a working paper by Kleimeier and Chaudhry (2013), which shows empirically that corporate loan spreads
are clustered most frequently at a multiple of 25 basis points. While this paper explain clustering via negotiation,
we argue that negotiation cannot explain clustering in the corporate loan market and we develop a new theoretical
model to explain clustering.
2In this paper, we use AAA rated borrowers as a proxy for high quality borrowers.
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the lender does not know the exact type of the borrower and categorizes these borrowers in certain
groups. Since the lender cannot differentiate the exact type of the borrower in one group, she
decides to offer a single rate to all of them. This is the main reason of clustered pricing for low
quality borrowers.
Our empirical findings confirm the theoretical argument and that we find most corporate loans
in the corporate loan market are priced at rounded spreads. First, consistent with our theoretical
argument, we find that clustering increases with the degree of uncertainty between the lender (or
lead arranger)3 and the borrower. Moreover, empirical evidences show that these rounded spreads
are a multiple of 25 basis points and these spreads are rounded upward. Second, a previous
relationship between lead arranger and borrower reduces uncertainty and hence persuades lead
arrangers to provide loans at exact spreads, because lead arrangers are able to derive search-
deterring rate that can be offered to the borrowers. Finally, the most reputable lead arrangers offer
loans at competitive non-rounded spreads providing evidence against tacit collusion hypothesis.
The empirical studies that first discussed negotiation cost hypothesis include Ball et al. (1985)
and Harris (1991). They discussed clustering in the context of gold and stock prices. Negotiation
cost hypothesis argues that the custom of clustering at rounded prices is a mechanism of reducing
the negotiation cost. If the value of an asset is uncertain, rounded prices can help traders reach
an agreement quickly. It can further be explained that it may also reduce the monitoring cost
attached to less errors associated with rounded prices. The empirical research on financial markets
is not scant that has documented that prices tend to cluster around rounded integers more than
the non-rounded ones. For example, (Niederhoffer, 1966; Harris, 1991; Christie and Schulz, 1994;
Ikenberry and Weston, 2007) discuss clustering in the stock market, (Ishii, 2014) in the auctions
market, (Liu and Witte, 2013) in the swap market, (Goodhart and Currio, 1990; Sopranzetti and
Datar, 2002) in the foreign exchange market, (Colwell et al., 1990; Ball et al., 1985; Ibbotson and
Jaffe, 1975; Ibbotson et al., 1994; Kandel et al., 2001) in the real estate market, in the gold market
and in the IPO market. Furthermore, there is a literature on the effect of market regulation on
price discreteness (Blau et al., 2012; Chung et al., 2002; French and Foster III, 2002) and on the
role of trader’s identity on pricing strategy (Chiao and Wang, 2009; Eun and Sabherwal, 2002; Liu
and Witte, 2013).
We reckon that negotiation is not the cause of clustering in corporate loan market. Why? If
negotiation were the cause of clustering then the borrowers having more negotiation power would
have been getting the clustered spreads. The borrowers on the high spectrum of the quality (AAA
rated borrowers) have mor negotiation power as compared to the low quality ones, because the
lenders compete on high quality borrowers and are willing to give them as competitive rates as
possible. Therefore, one would expect to observe clustered (truncated) prices for high quality
borrowers. However, we observe that these borrowers get the exact non-rounded spreads while low
quality borrower get rounded spreads. This phenomenon gives an initial support to our argument
that negotiation is not the cause of clustering, but there are some other factors causing clustering.
The corporate loan market is a wholesale market and negotiating to obtain the best possible price
3We use the terms lenders and lead arrangers interchangeably throughout this paper. We consider lead arrangers
as main lenders in a syndicated loan deal because they are the ones who are actively involve in writing a contract
with the borrower.
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is a huge concern for the wholesale borrowers. To give an example of the financial stake involved,
the mean (median) loan size in the corporate loan market is $923 ($424) million. A one basis
point increase in the spread can lead to a loss of $92,300 ($42,400) to a borrower. Therefore, the
borrowers are expected to care about the rate they get.
Next to negotiation hypothesis, tacit collusion of financiers might result in clustering of prices.
Tacit collusion happens when the dealers set rounded prices in order to maintain wider non-
competitive bid-ask spreads. Christie and Schulz (1994) and Christie et al. (1994) find evidence
for tacit collusion of NASDAQ dealers and Chen and Ritter (2000), in the IPO market, use tacit
collusion among investment bankers as an explanation of seven percent average spread. Intuitively,
tacit collusion can occur in the corporate loan market because this market is highly concentrated
and only a few top lead arrangers capture substantial market share. Our initial observation proves
that the lead arrangers offer clustered spreads to the borrowers whose quality is uncertain, which
might support tacit collusion hypothesis that lead arrangers collude tacitly for the borrowers who
are of lower quality. However, our empirical findings will indicate that lead arrangers with the
highest market share are actually less likely to offer rounded spreads. We thus conclude that the
tacit collusion hypothesis is also not the cause of clustering in the corporate loan market.
For the retail deposit market, Kahn et al. (1999) propose limited recall model where a depos-
itor truncates components of deposit interest rate when memorizing that rate. Truncation as an
encoding strategy involves cutting off digits on the right, to leave the most important digits on the
left, i.e., a spread of 199 basis points would be truncated to 190 or 100 basis points. The model
postulates that two extreme types of depositors exist - sophisticated depositors with full recall
and naive depositors who remember only the integer of the deposit rate. In practice, however,
the amount of recall may differ across depositors and depositors recall may be heterogeneous and
complex. Ashton and Hudson (2008) extend the truncated price theory of Kahn et al. (1999) to
rounding in the UK retail deposit and mortgage markets. Rounding is an encoding strategy where
each digit of the price considered sequentially. If a number is not already a round number then an
individual will round the number to the closest reference number, where the degree of rounding
depends on the distance to a reference number. For example, sophisticated consumers recall a
spread of 199 basis point as the nearest rounded spread of 200 basis point rather than a truncated
190 or 100 basis point. Ashton and Hudson (2008) furthermore argue that price clustering can be
seen as an action undertaken by price setters to maximize returns from consumers with limited
ability to recall and process number information.
The limited recall model is not able to explain clustering in the corporate loan market because
of the two differences. First, in the corporate loan market, the spreads are clustered at whole,
half or quarters of a percent rather than just above, in case of retail deposit market, or just below
in case of retail mortgage market. Second, in the retail deposit and retail mortgage market, the
lender offers one single rate and she maximizes the profit by offering lower rate to naive depositors
and higher rate to naive borrowers who either truncate or round the offered rates. On the contrary,
in the corporate loan market, there is no single rate to be be offered to all the borrowers rather
there is one to one contract for every borrower. Also the loan amount is big and there is a huge
stake involved for both the lender and the borrower. Even a fraction of lower or higher rate can
earn or save reasonable amount to the borrower or the lender. We therefore explore an alternative
4
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theoretical explanation based on the uncertainty about the quality of the borrower.
A discussion with a practitioner confirmed that it is a convention to use spread of 25 basis points
for borrowers having ratings lower than BBB and the clustering of spreads increase with increase
in the absolute level of spreads. However, the competition is high for AAA rated borrowers. The
lenders compete for these borrowers and sometimes offer rate lower than the cost. This confirms
our theoretical argument that the lenders offer search deterring rate, instead of profit maximizing
rate to the borrowers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the model of interest
rate clustering, section 3 explains data and methodology and section 4 presents empirical evidence
regarding the price clustering in the US corporate loan market. Section 5 provides robustness
checks and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model of Interest Rate Clustering
This section gives a model of interest rate clustering in the corporate loan market. Most corporate
loans are priced at rounded spreads, e.g. spreads that are a multiple of 25 basis points. We believe
that the attitude of the lender toward the uncertainty about the quality of the borrower leads
to the clustering of spreads. To study this, we introduce decision making under uncertainty into
the model given by Chatterjee and Lee (1998). We differ from Chatterjee and Lee (1998) in two
ways. First, the borrowers vary not only in the search cost, but also in the probability of getting
an outside offer. This probability reflects the quality of the borrower. Second, we assume that
the lender may not have full information on the quality of the borrowers and their search cost,
which causes uncertainty in the model. To this aim, we resort to the literature on decision making
under uncertainty. Chateauneuf et al. (2007) generalize the subjective expected utility theory by
taking into account the optimism and pessimism of the decision maker (worst and best in mind)
toward uncertainty. They evaluate an act (a function from states of the nature to the outcomes)
by considering a convex combination of the payoffs that can be derived from the worst possible
outcome, the best possible outcome, and the subjective probabilities. We take the same approach
in this paper for the lender who has a subjective probability on the type of the borrower, but she
also considers the best and the worst possible outcome to determine the optimal rate to offer to
the borrower. Olszweski (2007) also takes a similar approach to study a model of decision making
under uncertainty. He develops a model where the individual first chooses a set of lotteries, then the
nature selects a lottery from the chosen set. Therefore, the individual needs to evaluate different
sets of lotteries and he does this by considering a convex combination of the best and the worst
possible outcome.
We have a model with one lender and one borrower, who will be referred to as “she” and “he”
respectively throughout this section. Let r be the LIBOR and R be the spread. We consider a
game with two rounds. In the first round, the lender makes an offer R ∈ [0, 1]. In the second round,
the borrower either accepts the offer or searches in the market for another offer, while keeping the
offer R on hold.
We assume the probability that the borrower finds any offer below R is given by the cumulative
5
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F = Rt
R
t = 0.1
t = 0.5
t = 2
t = 4
1
1
Figure 2: Distribution F = Rt for t = 4, t = 2, t = 0.5, and t = 0.1.
distribution F (R) = Rt. The value of t in the distribution represents the quality of the borrower
in terms of the likelihood of getting an offer in the market. We say that the borrower is from type
t ∈ (0,∞). Clearly the smaller the value of t, the better chance the borrower has in getting the
offer R. Namely, the smaller the value of t, the higher is the quality of the borrower. Although
technically t can be a very large number, we believe that borrowers with very high values of t carry
high credit risk and are not eligible for credit. On the other hand, we think that having borrowers
with very small values of t is realistic, because lenders compete on lending to very high quality
borrowers, hence these borrowers are able to find an outside offer with a very high probability even
at very low rates.
We believe our choice for cumulative distribution functions better suits our model. What we
need is a set of continuous and increasing functions such that F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1. Also,
we want to be able to order these functions, as we need a range of high quality and low quality
borrowers. We can generalize Proposition 1 with a set of cumulative distributions that satisfies the
first order stochastic dominance property with respect to t. Note that our class of functions satisfies
this property. For Proposition 2 we have maintained the specific functional form for tractability,
although it could be generalized with further specifications on the class of distribution functions.4
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution F = Rt for borrowers with types t = 4, t = 2, t = 0.5,
and t = 0.1. As this Figure shows the borrower with t = 0.1 has reasonably high probability of
finding outside offer for even low rates. The borrower with type t = 4 has low probability of finding
outside offer for low rates, but for rates close to 1 this probability gets large. Also, from this figure
we can see that the value of t can be very small, as in this market the borrowers who are very well
reputed can easily find low rates. However, the borrowers with very high value of t are extremely
risky and do not have much chance of getting any offer.
In corporate loan market, the lender knows the type of the borrower if the borrower is from
very high quality while she may have partial information on the low quality borrowers. Because
for low quality borrowers, there is more information asymmetry on the quality of their investment
and their willingness to put efforts after the investment has been financed.
4Proofs are available upon request.
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Now let R be any rate offered by the bank. The borrower would reject the offer if he can find
an outside offer x, such that x < R. But to find an outside offer he needs to incur the search
cost of c. We assume that c = c(t), as it might vary for borrowers from different types. Further,
we assume that c = c(t) is a non-decreasing function. Suppose that the value of the loan for the
borrower is 1. If the borrower accepts the offer immediately, his payoff is 1−R. If he searches in
the market while sitting on the offer R, his expected payoff is
φ(R) = −c(t) +
∫ R
0
(1− x)f(x)dx+
∫ 1
R
(1−R)f(x)dx. (1)
The first term in the function φ(R) is the cost of search. The second term is the borrowers’ expected
payoff if the outcome of the search in the market is x, while x < R. In this case he will reject R
and accept x. The third term is the borrowers’ expected payoff if the outcome of the search in the
market is x, while x > R. In this case he will accept R. Now, the borrower would be indifferent
between accepting the offer R immediately and searching to get a better offer if
1−R = φ(R) (2)
From equation above for F (R) = Rt we find the solution R∗ = t+1
√
(t+ 1)c(t). The calculations
can be found in the Appendix 7.1. One can check that R∗ = R∗(t) is an increasing function of t. If
the borrower gets any offer R such that 1−R > φ(R), then he would accept the offer immediately
and if 1 − R < φ(R) he would rather prefer search in the market and bear the search cost. This
is equivalent to the statement that the borrower would accept offer R immediately, if R < R∗ and
search in the market if R > R∗.5 Hence, the rate R∗ is called the maximum search deterring rate.
Furthermore, we assume that c(t) ≤ 11+t to avoid the cases where the value of R∗ gets larger than
1. Note that for very large values of t, i.e. for very risky borrowers, the condition c(t) ≤ 11+t may
not hold. This intuitively means that for very risky borrowers it is not possible to find a search
deterring rate.
Now, as the probability that the offer gets accepted after search is 1−F (R), one can write the
lenders’ expected payoff function as
EΠ(R) =
{
R if R ≤ R∗
R(1− F (R)) if R > R∗
(3)
Let pi(R) = R(1−F (R)). To maximize EΠ(R), we need to find the maximum point for the function
pi(R). Therefore, we have
dpi(R)
dR
= (1− F (R))−Rf(R) = 0 (4)
⇒ R¯ = (1− F (R¯))
f(R¯)
. (5)
Moreover, for F (R) = Rt we have R¯ = t
√
1
t+1 . It is easy to see that depending on t, the function
5This result is shown by Chatterjee and Lee (1998).
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EΠ(R) is maximized either in R∗ or R¯.
The lender is better off by offering R∗ than R¯, if R∗ > pi(R¯). Chatterjee and Lee (1998) discuss
that how a seller’s pricing strategy depends on the search cost of a buyer. However, in corporate
loan market, the borrowers differ from one another not only in the search cost, but also in the the
distribution F .
If the lender knows the type t of the borrower (and consequently the distribution F = Rt and
search cost c(t)), then she knows the values of R∗ and R¯ for this borrower. Therefore, she needs
to make a choice between these two pricing strategies: to offer R∗, that is the maximum search
deterring rate with the payoff of R∗ or to offer R¯, with the expected payoff of pi(R¯). The following
proposition shows the conditions under which R∗ > pi(R¯). The proof of this result can be found
in the appendix.
Proposition 1. Let R¯ = arg maxRpi(R), where pi(R) = R(1− Rt) and R∗ be such that 1− R∗ =
φ(R∗). Then, there is a function c0(t) such that for every t > 0, when c(t) > c0(t) we have
R∗ > pi(R¯) and when c(t) ≤ c0(t) we have R∗ ≤ pi(R¯). Moreover, c0(t) −→ 0 as t→ 0.
The first part of the proposition states that for every type t of the borrower, there is a threshold
c0(t) such that for every search cost higher than c0(t), the lender prefers search deterring strategy
to payoff maximization strategy. The second part of the proposition shows that in the case t is
very small (the borrower is from very high quality), the threshold c0(t) that makes R
∗ > pi(R¯)
is also very small. Intuitively, it says that for the very high quality borrowers, the lender prefers
to offer the search deterring rate. This makes sense because the very hight quality borrowers not
only have very small search cost but also they have very steep distribution F , and the lender’s
pricing strategy for such borrowers would be to offer a rate that prevents them to search in the
market. There is no doubt that this rate would be very small, but still the lender prefers reaching
agreement with very high quality borrowers as quickly as possible. Moreover, as the lender knows
the exact value of t for such borrowers, she can derive the exact value of R∗ to offer. Therefore
the rate for very high quality borrowers are not clustered. This result also justifies our empirical
evidence at the lower end of the distribution in Figure 1.
On the other hand, the lender may not have full information on the type of the low quality
borrowers, in other words she may not know the exact value of t if t is large enough. Therefore,
she needs to make decision under imprecise information or uncertainty. For this, as we explain
above, we resort to the literature on decision making under uncertainty. Chateauneuf et al. (2007)
generalize the subjective expected utility theory by taking into account the optimism and pessimism
of the decision maker (worst and best in mind) toward uncertainty. They evaluate an act (a function
from states of the nature to the outcomes) by considering a convex combination of the payoff
that can be derived from the worst possible outcome, the best possible outcome, and subjective
probabilities. We take the same approach in this paper for the lender who has some subjective
probability on the type of the borrower, but she also considers the best and worst possible outcomes
to determine the optimal rate to offer to the borrower.
The lender does not know the exact value of t for low quality borrowers. However, based on
8
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her partial information she knows that t is within a subinterval of (0,∞), say Ti = [ti−1, ti], and
she decides to offer a single rate to any borrower belonging to this subinterval. Let Ri be the rate
to be offered to a borrower of the type t ∈ Ti. We first show that under a mild condition for cost
function we have Ri ∈ [R∗(ti−1), R∗(ti)] (Proposition 2). This condition is c(0) < 1e ' 0.37, which
is not very restrictive because the highest quality borrower has very low search cost. The proof
can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 2. Assume for the search cost function c(t) we have c(0) < 1e . Then, there is a type
t˜ such that for every ti > t˜ we have Ri ∈ [R∗(ti−1), R∗(ti)].
Note we assume that the lender has enough information on each borrower to identify exactly a
subinterval of types within which the borrower can be placed. Moreover, the lender offers same rate
to any borrowers with types within this interval. Therefore, we do not have an adverse selection
problem as the borrower is not offered a menu of contracts.
Now we discuss how the rate Ri, to be offered to any borrower whose type is within the interval
Ti, can be derived. From Proposition 2, we conclude that there is a t
∗
i ∈ Ti such that Ri = R∗(t∗i )
because R∗(t) is a continuous function. For every t ≥ t∗i , as R∗ is an increasing function, we have
R∗(t) ≥ R∗(t∗i ) = Ri. Therefore Ri will be accepted immediately. Similarly for every t < t∗i , we
have R∗(t) ≤ R∗(t∗i ) = Ri, which leads to a search in the market by the borrower and Ri will be
accepted with the probability of (1− F (Ri)). Hence, the lenders’ expected payoff is:
EΠ(Ri)(t) =
{
Ri if t ≥ t∗i
Ri(1− F (Ri)) if t < t∗i
(6)
Let µi be the lender’s subjective probability for the type of borrower on the subinterval Ti, then
her expected payoff is
EΠs(Ri) =
∫ t∗i
ti−1
Ri(1− F (Ri))dµi(t) +
∫ ti
t∗i
Ridµi(t) (7)
However, the lender’s payoff based on the best possible outcome (that is every type in Ti accepts
the offer immediately) and the worst possible outcome (that is every type in Ti searches in the
market) as well as the subjective probability is
EΠb(Ri) = αiRi + (1− αi − βi) EΠs(Ri) + βiRi(1− F (Ri)) (8)
The parameters αi and βi represent the decision maker’s attitude toward imprecise information
for borrowers from the type belonging to Ti, where αi is called the degree of the decision maker’s
optimism and βi is called the degree of decision maker’s pessimism toward imprecise information.
The rate Ri can be found by maximizing EΠb(Ri) over Ti. One can see that the rate Ri is a function
of t, µi, αi, and βi. We predict that in such situations decision makers’ underlying behavior is
such that they choose αi and βi in a way that Ri is a rounded number. We confirm this behavioral
prediction in our empirical analysis in section 4 that most of the interest rate spreads are clustered.
9
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R∗
ti−1 ti
Ri
R∗(ti−1)
R∗(ti)
Figure 3: This figure shows the optimal rate that the lender offers to the borrower with type t.
The argument above shows how imprecise information on the borrowers’ quality can cause spikes
in the distribution of spreads in Figure 1.
Overall, for the borrowers with type t small enough, where there is no uncertainty, the exact
rate of R∗ would be offered. When t gets larger, the uncertainty on the value of t causes jumps
in the offered rate to the borrower. Basically, for t large enough, the lender offers a rate Ri ∈
[R∗(ti−1), R∗(ti)] to any borrower with type in the interval [ti−1, ti]. This argument is illustrated
in Figure 3.
Note that our model is a static model (it has only one period of time) in two rounds; in the
first round the lender offers a rate to the borrower, and in the second round the borrower either
accepts the offer or decides to search in the market for another rate. One natural extension of
this model is to consider a dynamic model. We give a brief discussion on this extension. Assume
that in period two, the lender intends to offer a rate to a borrower of low quality. We have two
cases: (1) If the borrower is new to the lender, then we are back to the first period model. In this
case, the lender does not know the exact type of the borrower, but she knows that his type lies
within a certain interval. (2) If the borrower was in relationship with the lender in the first period
(the lender has given the loan to the borrower in the first period), then the lender can refine the
interval from the first period relationship. As an extreme case we can assume that she knows the
type of the borrower in this case. Consequently, in this extreme case the lender knows the value
of t for this borrower and she can calculate the exact (non-clustered) optimal rate to offer to the
borrower. By the above discussion, we have a more complete picture for our model, as now we can
justify the high non-clustered rates in Figure 1.
We would like to emphasize here that the bargaining in this market does not cause the clustering
phenomenon. We argue that bargaining only helps the low quality borrower to move from a larger
rounded number to a smaller rounded number. To make this argument clearer, without loss of
generality, assume (i) the borrower does not need to reject the offer to search in the market, (ii)
the borrower can only bargain based on an outside offer. Let R0 be the rate offered by the lender
and R∗ be the maximum search deterring rate for the borrower, known to the borrower . Note that
because of the uncertainty we explained above, R0 is a rounded number. If R0 ≤ R∗, the borrower
accepts the offer immediately and if R0 > R
∗, the borrower searches in the market, incurs the
10
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search cost c and finds the rate R1. In the latter case, if R1 ≤ R∗, the borrower would accept the
offer R1. Also, in this case the borrower can bargain with the first lender over the rate R0 to be
reduced to R1 due to some other features in the contract. Note that R1 is a rounded number too
by a similar argument as for R0. Therefore, we see that the borrower eventually either gets the
rate R0 or the rate R1, where both of them are rounded numbers and bargaining might only help
to move from R0 to R1.
3 Data Description and Methodology
To examine the interest rate clustering in the corporate loan market, we obtain syndicated loans
data from Thomson One, which contains detailed information of syndicated lenders, borrowers
and pricing of loans. The sample we use includes the whole population of 21,855 loan tranches to
4,718 U.S. firms issued anytime from January 2000 to December 2015. We include loans for which
the data on industry of the borrower, maturity of the loan, loan amount, loan signing date and
pricing of loan as spread over LIBOR are available. We include only syndicated loans and exclude
all club syndicates and bilateral loans. We also exclude tranches for which the spread is not based
on LIBOR, they were only 636 such loan tranches. We use “initialpricing” field in the Thomson
One database for extracting spread over LIBOR.
We conduct our analysis at the tranche level because interest rates are decided at tranche level.
In our sample 70% of the loans have a single tranche. Summary statistics for the full sample are
given in Table 1. We start with the loan characteristics because our primary variable of interest
is spread over LIBOR. Mean spread over LIBOR for a typical loan is 207.31 basis points and the
mean loan size is $923.13 million. The size of loans have increased greatly in recent years. For
example, healthcare is the top sector for global $10bn plus loans since 2010, with 20 deals totaling
$313.3bn. Finance is second with 15 deals, totaling $264.4bn followed by Telecoms with 13 deals
totaling $220.1bn as reported by Dealogic market insights6. Other loan characteristics include:
The mean maturity of a loan is about 4 years, 30% of the loans are multiple tranches loans, 30%
are term loans and 22% carry a covenant with them. About 59% of the borrowers have S&P long
term rating and 6% do not have a ticker meaning they are not listed on either stock market or
bond market. 68% of the borrowers have accessed syndicated loan market in the past and only
31% acquired loan from the same lender when they accessed the syndicated loan market in the
past. Top 5 lead arrangers7 lend 47% of the loans in our sample. The syndicated loan market is
very concentrated and only a few players control a huge percentage of the total loan market.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Figure 1 gives the actual frequency distribution of the clustering of interest rate spreads over
LIBOR in basis points in the US syndicated loan market. The histogram shows the number of
observations at each basis point that spreads are multiples of 25 basis points above LIBOR. This
clustering tendency increases at higher spread levels and also the interval of rounding increase as
6See http://www.dealogic.com/media/market-insights/loans-statshot/
7The arrangers who get a mandate to lead a syndicated loan deal are called lead arrangers. They are responsible
for due diligence of the borrower and agree on the terms and conditions of the loan with the borrower.
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the level of spreads increase.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
According to our theoretical argument, the lender’s attitude toward uncertainty about the
quality of the borrower leads to rounding of spreads. This uncertainty comes from information
asymmetry between the lender and the borrower. The higher the information asymmetry, the
higher the occurrence of clustered spreads. The borrowers who are able to reveal more information
about their affairs get non-rounded spreads. To test these theoretical arguments, we estimate a
logit model. A logit model is a regression model where the dependent variable is categorical and in
our case it is a binary dependent variable, which is the spread over LIBOR defined as 1 if the spread
is a multiple of 25 basis points and 0 otherwise. Other methods to test a binary response models
are linear probability model (LPM) and probit model. A logit model has advantages over LPM
and probit model. One of the shortcomings of LPM is that it can produce estimated probabilities
that are lower than 0 or greater than 1. The logit model produces fitted values that are confined
within the interval [0,1]. A probability by definition falls within the interval [0,1] and the predicted
probability outside the interval [0,1] is meaningless. Furthermore, LPM is a linear model and it is
not plausible to claim that a probability is linearly related to a contin ous explanatory variable for
all possible values. If it were, then continually increasing this explanatory variable would eventually
drive P (y = 1|x) above 1 or below 0 (Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010; Brooks, 2014).8 The logit
model has advantage of interpretability over the probit model.9 The transformation for the logit
model is directly interpretable as a log-odds. Thus, we estimate the logit model as follows:
Pi(yi = 1) = G(zi)
with zi = β0 + β1x1i + ...+ βkxki
and 0 ≤ G(zi) ≤ 1
Using the cumulative standard logistic distribution function
F (zi) =
1
1 + exp−zi
evaluated at zi = β0 + β1X1i + ...+ βkXki.
Where yi is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the spread is a multiple of 25 basis points and
0 otherwise and xi is a vector of explanatory variables. The corresponding log-likelihood function
that is maximized is:
lnL = −
N∑
i=1
[yi ln(1 + exp
−zi) + (1− yi) ln(1 + exp−zi ].
8Another issue is that the LPM produce heteroskedastic residual but this issue can be resolved by using robust
standard errors while estimating the LPM.
9Although logit model is simple compared to the probit as the equation of the logistic cumulative distribution
function (CDF) is simple, whereas the normal CDF has an unevaluated integral yet this difference is not acute under
dichotomous data.
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Where N is the total number of observations.
Since the form of the function is Pi = F (zi), instead of Pi = β0 + β1x1i + ... + βkxki, the
direct interpretation of βk will be incorrect. Therefore, we report marginal effects of the estimates
and differentiate F , where F is the logistic function, with respect to zi to interpret the coefficients
and the derivative is βkF (zi).
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Evidence of Clustering
We use the following dependent and explanatory variables to explain clustering of interest rate
spreads in the corporate loan market. Our dependent variable is the spread over LIBOR, which
is defined as 1 if the spread is a multiple of 25 basis points and 0 otherwise. It is important to
highlight at this point that 25 basis points is merely some integer point where spreads are clustered
more frequently. If the spreads are at the lower end of the distribution, say from 0 to 10, they
tend to cluster more frequently at 5 basis points and if the spreads are at the higher end of the
distribution, they tend to cluster more frequently at 50 or 100 basis points. Since Figure 1 shows
that the spreads are clustered more frequently at 25 basis, we find it more plausible to use spread
at a multiple of 25 basis points as our baseline dependent variable.
Our primary variables of interest are unrated borrower and private borrower. As the uncertainty
stems from the degree of information asymmetry, our first proxy for uncertainty is the rating of
the borrower. As it is well established in the literature th t the information about the borrower
is more likely to be opaque when the borrower does not have a credit rating (see for example,
Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2007; Chaudhry and Kleimeier, 2015). The borrowers reveal
less information which increases the uncertainty about their affairs if they have not been rated by
a rating agency. The lenders are more likely to offer rounded spreads to such borrowers as it has
been shown in our theory in section 2 above. Based on the information about the borrowers rating
in the Thomson One database, we classify borrowers as unrated borrowers if they do not have an
S&P long term debt rating. We measure it with a dummy = 1 if they have an S&P long term
debt rating or 0 otherwise. The borrowers not listed on the financial markets with either equity
or bond issues reveal a very little public information and hence increase uncertainty about their
affairs. Therefore, we consider our second proxy for uncertainty is the dummy = 1 if the borrowers
have no ticker available in the Thomson One database or 0 otherwise. Since both these borrowers
reflect similar characteristics, we group them into one category as (“opaque”), which is defined
as the dummy = 1 if the borrowers have either S&P long term debt rating or a ticker available
in the Thomson One database. From Table 2 onward, we perform our analysis only on “opaque”
borrowers.
Next we employ two proxies that reduce the information asymmetry. One is the existing
borrower and the second is former lender. Existing borrower is defined as a dummy = 1 if the
borrower has accessed the syndicated loan market within past five years or 0 otherwise. Chaudhry
and Kleimeier (2015) find stronger effects of information asymmetry reduction; the more recent
the borrowers have accessed the syndicated loan market. We therefore follow them and devise
13
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our proxy, existing borrowers, as a dummy = 1 if a borrower raised loans during the previous five
years. With repeated access, the borrowers should have become known to the potential lenders and
exhibit less uncertainty thus the theory predicts that the lenders should not give rounded spread to
such borrowers. Former lender is the lender who has previous relationship with the borrower and
is defined as a dummy = 1 if one of the lead arrangers has relationship within past five years or 0
otherwise. With previous interactions with a borrower, the lenders should have known more about
the affairs of the borrower and hence information asymmetry should be less (Sufi, 2007; Chaudhry
and Kleimeier, 2015). Our theory also predicts a non-rounded spread for such borrowers.
The control variables include year and industry dummies, the natural log of loan size as a proxy
for borrower size, loan to sales ratio as a proxy for relative loan size, a dummy = 1 if the loan
has more than one tranche, a dummy = 1 if a loan deal contains a term loan, the natural log
of maturity of the loan in days and an indicator variable for whether a loan carries a covenant.
Finally, all standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, and clustered at the borrower as well as
at the lender level.
Table 2 presents evidence of rounding of spreads by using logit regressions. We report marginal
effects for all of our logit regressions. In regression 1, we use only unrated borrowers and private
borrowers as explanatory variables without any controls. We find that lenders give rounded spreads
to both unrated and private borrowers. The unrated borrowers get rounded spread more often
compared with private borrowers. In regression 2, we add borrower and lender fixed effects and
find very similar results. It shows that the variation within borrowers and lenders do not have any
effect on our baseline results. In regression 3, we add a few more borrower and loan characteristics
and our results remain the same except that the marginal effects for private borrower are the same
as that of unrated borrowers. Overall our baseline results are consistent with our theory that
low quality borrowers defined by the proxies of unrated borrower as well as private borrower get
rounded spreads from the lenders.
We use complete models in Table 3. Since both unrated and private borrowers show similar
results, we group them into one category (“opaque”) and do further analyses on opaque borrower
category. In regression 1, we include all the borrower and loan characteristics together with bor-
rower and lender fixed effects, year and industry dummies. We find that opaque borrowers are
more likely to get rounded spreads. In regression 2, we add existing borrowers, the borrowers who
repeatedly access the loan market. Consistent with our theory, we find that the marginal effects of
existing borrowers is significantly negative. In regression 3, we use former lender proxy, the lenders
who have acted as a former lender to a borrower, as another proxy of reduction in information
asymmetry or uncertainty. We indeed find a negative significant marginal effects showing that the
borrowers who have previous relationship with a lender get non-rounded spread.
Next to our primary proxies, we find negative significant marginal effects for borrower size.
Large borrowers are usually high quality who do not exhibit greater uncertainty. This result is
also in agreement with our argument that lenders offer non-rounded spread to large borrowers
and clustering happens because of the uncertainty about the quality of the borrower. However,
we do not find significant results for relative loan size showing that uncertainty is reduced only
by large borrowers and the relative loan size cannot act as a uncertainty reduction proxy.10 Our
10This is a control variable and its insignificant effect does not contradict with our theory. Our variable of interest,
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other control variables of a natural log of maturity, indicator variables for a multiple tranche loan,
a term loan in a deal and a loan carrying a covenant all show positive significant marginal effects
showing lenders consider such loans more uncertain and offer rounded spreads. This is inline with
the literature because longer maturity loans and term loans are considered to be riskier for lenders
because the probability of default of a loan increases with maturity. One possible explanation
for positive significant marginal effects for a multiple tranche loan is that they are complex and
lenders might take them as more risky. Finally, positive significant marginal effects for a loan with
covenants can be explained by the fact that covenant and collateral are associated with riskier
borrowers (Berger and Udell, 1990; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004; Indersta and Mueller, 2007).
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here]
4.2 Unobserved credit risk is not related to rounding
In order to show rounding of spreads happens because of uncertainty about the quality of a borrower
and that unobserved credit risk is not related to rounding of spreads over LIBOR, we get residuals
from loan pricing regression and put them as explanatory variables in a logit regression to see if
they can significantly explain rounding of spreads. Before, we do this, we first run loan pricing
regressions to show the evidence of upward rounding of spreads. Kahn et al. (1999) and Ashton
and Hudson (2008) also provide evidence that lenders maximize profits by rounding or truncating
interest rates in their favor. We use the same model as in Tables 2 and 3 but we add borrower’s
risk based on its rating, which is in line with the empirical loan pricing literature (Gorton and
Pennacchi, 1995; Carey and Nini, 2007; Ivashina, 2009).
Before running loan pricing regressions to show the evidence of upward rounding of spreads,
we describe the summary statistics for rounded and non-rounded spreads in Table 4. Table 4
presents number, mean, median and standard deviation of loans with rounded spreads and non-
rounded spreads in our sample. Out of total 21,855 loans, 15,659 (about 72%) loans are with
rounded spreads and 6,196 (about 28%) are with non-rounded spreads. In our sample mean opaque
borrowers are more (48%) who get rounded spreads compared with (36%) who do do get rounded
spreads. However, mean existing borrowers, mean top 5 lead arrangers and mean former lender
are more (74%, 54% and 33% respectively) for borrowers getting non-rounded spreads compared
with (66%, 44% and 30% respectively) borrowers getting rounded spreads. These statistics provide
initial support to our theory that if there is uncertainty about the quality of borrower, like opaque
borrower, the borrowers get rounded spread. If the uncertainty about their quality is reduced by
accessing the loan market repeatedly or by repeated interactions, then lenders feel comfortable
about borrowers’ quality and offer them non-rounded spreads. Mean spread over LIBOR for a
typical loan with rounded spread is much higher, i.e., 254.21 basis points compared with only
88.79 basis points for a loan with non-rounded spreads. The loans with non-rounded spreads are
much larger, i.e., mean $1174.52 million compared with $823.66 million for loans with rounded
the “Opaque borrower” in regression 1 of Table 3 shows that the low quality borrowers get rounded spread from the
lenders. Nevertheless, this is consistent with some of the literature (Berger et al., 2005; Champagne and Coggins,
2012).
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spreads. The maturity, the number of multiple tranches in a loan deal and a loan is a term loan
in a deal all are higher for loans with rounded spreads.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Now we present loan pricing regression results. Table 5 provides evidence of upward rounding
of spreads over LIBOR. Our dependent variable is spread over LIBOR measured as a spread given
to borrowers over LIBOR. Our primary variable of interest is a dummy = 1 if the spread is rounded
at a multiple of 25 basis points or 0 otherwise. Regression 1 gives positive coefficient indicating
that loans with rounded spreads are rounded upwards by an average of 125.38 basis points. The
inclusion of loan characteristics in regression 2 does not change the sign and significance of rounded
spread proxy. However, the average spread reduces to 104.57 basis points. This raises a question
that the rounding might be related to some unobserved credit risk and not because of uncertainty
about the quality of the borrower.11
To check whether the unobserved credit risk is related to rounding of spreads over LIBOR,
we get residuals from regression 1 and 2 of Table 5 and put them as explanatory variables in a
logit regression, which is shown in Table 6. The residuals are the unobserved credit risk that are
not captured by the model. Our dependent variable is a dummy = 1 if the spread is rounded
at a multiple of 25 basis points or 0 otherwise. We want to see if these unobserved credit risk
characteristics explain the rounding of spreads over LIBOR. Both regressions 1 and 2 in Table 6
are the same as regressions 3 in Table 2 except that we do not add loan characteristics in regression
1 to see whether loan characteristics have any different impact. This makes the model similar to
regression 1 of Table 5. We find that in both the regressions, residual is not statistically significant
indicating that unobserved credit risk is not related to rounding of spreads.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
4.3 Intertemporal changes and rounding over different range of spreads
In Tables 2 and 3, we gave evidence of rounding of spreads over LIBOR at a multiple of 25 basis
points. However, in Table 5 we observe that lenders are rounding the spreads upward by about
125 basis points when we do not include loan characteristics and about 104 basis points when we
include loan characteristics. If lenders round an interest rate spreads upward the maximum number
of basis points which they round upward is 24 basis points (e.g. from 301 to 325). On average we
should expect a coefficient around 10 basis points. Whereas we find that they round on average
124 and 104 basis points. We give two explanations for this. One is that it is because of the overall
interest rate environment and the second is that it is because of the different range of interest rate
spreads. Regarding overall interest rate environment, if a Central Bank follows a contractionary
monetary policy and the interest rate levels are higher then the spread over LIBOR might be
11We also predict spreads from the sub-sample loan-pricing regressions of 6,196 loans that are priced at non-
rounded spreads over LIBOR and compare them with actual spreads of 15,659 loans that are rounded. We find that
the average actual spread is much higher than the predicted spread i.e., 122.3 and 132.4 basis points for regression
1 and regression 2 respectively. The results are available on demand.
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higher on average as well. On the contrary, if a Central Bank follows an expansionary monetary
policy and the interest rate levels are lower then the spread over LIBOR might be lower on average
as well. This has further impact on the rounding in the sense that when spread level is higher,
the rounding might occur at higher multiples. We get a figure (Figure 4) from ICE Benchmark
Administration Limited (IBA) of Federal Reserve at St. Louis, which shows the 12-Month LIBOR,
based on US Dollar from 1995 till 2015. We can see from the figure that the LIBOR was more
than 5% on average from 1995 to 2000 and about 3% on average from 2000 to 2005 and the level
dropped to about 1% from 2009 till 2015.
To see whether the level of LIBOR has any bearing on the level of spread over LIBOR, we split
our sample into two subsamples. One subsample is from 2000 to 2005 when the LIBOR level was
about 3% and the second from 2009 to 2015 when the LIBOR level was about 1%. The results are
given in Table 7. Regressions 1 and 2 are the same as regression 2 in Table 5. Regression 1 shows
the results of a subsample from 2000 to 2005 and regression 2 shows results of a subsample from
2009 to 2015. We can see the spread over LIBOR was higher, i.e., 118.66 basis points when the
overall LIBOR level was higher during 2000 to 2005 and the spread over LIBOR was lower , i.e.,
87.12 basis points when the overall LIBOR level was lower.
The size and sign of some of the control variables vary across the two regressions. For example,
the size of the indicator variable of a multiple tranche is much higher for the subsample from
2009 to 2015. One plausible explanation for this is that loans with multiple trancehs are complex
and lenders consider them riskier. After the global financial crisis, the banks have become more
prudent in their lending practices and they require even higher spread for loans that are complex
and riskier. As we explain above the average LIBOR level dropped to about 1% during the
period from 2009 to 2015. The insignificant natural log of maturity variable in regression 2 can be
explained by the fact that at low levels of interest rates, the lenders do not want to lock themselves
to longer maturity loans and focus only on shorter term loans with the expectation to lend at
higher rates in future. Therefore, we do not find any relationship between spread above LIBOR
and the natural log of maturity in regression 2. Furthermore, we note that the sign of the covenant
inverses from positive to negative in regression 2. As we know the risk of borrowers increased
during the global financial crisis and in order to get favorable contract terms, the higher quality
borrowers are willing to provide more covenants than low quality borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Furthermore, covenants and collateral also help to mitigate
moral hazard problem after the loan is disbursed (Boot et al., 1991). Therefore, we find negative
relationship between spread over LIBOR and covenant as high quality borrowers are more likely
to provide covenants who get loans at lower spreads.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The second explanation of getting a higher upward rounding spread is the different range of
interest rate spreads. To confirm this, we split our sample into three subsamples based on the level
of spread over LIBOR. Our first subsample is over a range when the spread over LIBOR is from 0
to 99 basis points, second subsample is when the spread over LIBOR is from 100 to 199 basis points
and the third subsample is when the spread over LIBOR is above 199 basis points. We run OLS
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regression as in Table 7 and present results in Table 8. In our dataset, there is no borrower with
rating D that has received the loan with spread over LIBOR from 0 to 99 and spread over LIBOR
from 100 to 199. This is why there is no result on “RatingD” in regressions 1 and 2. Our results
in regressions 1, 2 and 3 show that at lower range of spreads, the rounding occurs lower levels and
at higher range of spreads, the rounding occurs at higher levels. This confirms our argument that
the rounding does not necessarily occur at a multiple of 25 basis points but varies across LIBOR
levels as well as across spread over LIBOR levels.
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here]
4.4 Interest rate clustering across the type of industry and during the
financial crisis
Although we include industry dummies as controls in all of our regressions yet we test whether
the type of industry has any bearing on interest rate clustering.12 We use our complete model
of regression 1 in Table 3 and run a set of regressions on top five industries namely: Energy and
Power, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Products and Services, and Technology. We indeed find
that there are differences across industries with respect to interest rate clustering. For example,
we find that the lenders do not provide rounded spreads to borrowers from the industry type
of “Industrials”. However, we do find evidence of interest rate clustering in all other top four
industries. We report these results in Table 9.
Next, to investigate whether the interest rate clustering in the corporate loan market is signif-
icantly different after the global financial crisis, we split our sample into three subsamples.13 Our
first subsample is the pre crisis sample for the period from January 2000 to December 2007. As
there is always a time lag between the loan approval and the loan disbursement, we consider the
period till December 2007 as a pre crisis period. Our second subsample is the crisis sample for
the period from January 2008 to December 2010 and our third subsample is the post crisis sample
for the period from January 2011 to December 2015. The results are reported in Table 10. We
use our complete model of regression 1 in Table 3. We indeed find that the risk of borrowers have
increased during the global financial crisis as the low quality borrowers get more rounded spreads
for the period from January 2008 to December 2010. One interesting finding is that the marginal
effect of the opaque borrower variable is lower after the global financial crisis compared to the
pre crisis period indicating that the borrowers get less rounded spread after the global financial
crisis. This is consistent with the literature that banks received liquidity and funding during the
global financial crisis and they restricted the supply of credit to firms (Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2011, 2012; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2014; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012; Popov and Udell, 2012).
Consequently, many low quality borrowers left the market and the remaining borrowers are of
high quality relatively who get exact spreads. Therefore, we find the magnitude of interest rate
clustering is less after the global financial crisis.
12We thank an anonymous referee for this comment.
13We thank an anonymous referee for this comment.
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4.5 Evidence against tacit collusion hypothesis
As motivated in section 1 above that a few lead arrangers might tacitly collude in the corporate
loan market, which is highly concentrated, because of the substantial market share. However,
we empirically test this by using a dummy = 1 if one of the lead arrangers is among top 5 who
hold highest market share. If we find a positive significant coefficient, it would show that the lead
arrangers who are in a position to collude because of their substantial market share, are colluding
and offering higher rounded spread to borrowers. On the contrary, if we find a negative significant
coefficient, it would indicate that the top lead arrangers are not tacitly colluding. We reproduce
regressions 2 and 3 of Table 3 and include Top 5 lead arrangers proxy and run logit regression.
The negative significant marginal effects confirm that the top 5 lead arrangers are not involved in
tacit collusion and hence we reject this hypothesis that rounding of spreads is happening because
of tacit collusion hypothesis. The results are reported in Table 11.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
5 Robustness checks
In all our empirical analyses, we cluster standard errors at both borrower and lender level to
capture the variation across borrowers and lenders. Since most of the empirical literature cluster
standard errors only at borrower level, we perform a robustness check if our results are robust if we
cluster standard errors only at borrower level. We find our results are robust if we cluster standard
errors only at borrower level. The results are presented in Table 12.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
Furthermore, we do analysis on all the firms. We do not excluded financial firms from our
sample. We check here that whether our results are robust if we exclude financial firms from our
sample and perform analysis only on non-financial firms as financial firms are more likely to be
known to the lenders because of being in the same industry. Furthermore, most of the empirical
literature on loan pricing exclude financial firms from their analyses (Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009;
Chaudhry and Kleimeier, 2015). We present our results in Table 13 and find that all of our results
are robust to the exclusion of financial firms and even slightly stronger both economically and
statistically.
[Insert Table 13 about here]
6 Summary and conclusions
Given the friction that spreads in the US corporate loan market cluster at certain levels, we set
out to answer the following question: Why do corporate loan spreads cluster? We argue that the
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existing theories like negotiation hypothesis, tacit collusion hypothesis and limited recall model
cannot answer these questions. We develop a theoretical argument and test it empirically that the
attitude of the lender toward the uncertainty about the quality of the borrower leads to clustering
of spreads over LIBOR. In the corporate loan market, clustering increases with the degree of
uncertainty, e.g. information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower. However, a previous
lending relationship between lender and borrower reduces this uncertainty and hence persuades
lenders to provide loans at non-rounded spreads. We also show empirically that the unobserved
credit risk do not explain rounding of spreads over LIBOR in the US corporate loan market. As
loans are generally priced at upwardly rounded spreads, we provide evidence against tacit collusion
hypothesis that the most reputable lead arrangers offer loans at competitive non-rounded spreads.
Our study highlights an important loan market friction that loans are clustered at certain
levels and provides argument for this friction. Corporate borrowers are sophisticated and you do
not expect that loans are not offered at exact spreads rather at some rounded spread and more
so are rounded upwards. Furthermore, corporate loans are big in volume and one basis point can
have high costs for the borrowers especially if they are rounded upwards. The identification of such
a friction has a great impact on proper functioning of the loan market that can contribute toward
its development. The relationship between developed financial markets and economic growth is
well established in the literature (see Levine, 2005; Beck, 2012 among others). This study also
has policy implications because it brings this friction to the attention of policy makers who can
influence lenders to properly price the loans and eliminate this friction from the corporate loan
market.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of R∗ = t+1
√
(t+ 1)c(t)
From equations (1) and (2) we have
1−R = φ(R) = −c(t) +
∫ R
0
(1− x)f(x)dx+
∫ 1
R
(1−R)f(x)dx.
Also, we know the cumulative distribution is F (R) = Rt. Therefore, the density distribution is
f(R) = tRt−1. Now, we have
1−R = −c(t) +
∫ R
0
(1− x)txt−1dx+
∫ 1
R
(1−R)txt−1dx.
By taking the integrals we calculate
1−R = −c(t) +
[
xt − t
t+ 1
xt+1
]R
0
+ (1−R) [xt]1
R
⇒ 1−R = −c(t) +Rt − t
t+ 1
Rt+1 + (1−R)(1−Rt)
⇒ 1−R = −c(t) +Rt
(
1− t
t+ 1
R− (1−R)
)
+ 1−R
⇒ 0 = −c(t) +Rt
(
1
t+ 1
)
⇒ R = t+1
√
(t+ 1)c(t)
Therefore, the maximum search deterring rate R∗ is t+1
√
(t+ 1)c(t).
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We know that R∗ = t+1
√
(t+ 1)c(t), where c(t) ≤ 1t+1 for every t. We show that if c(t) > c0(t)
where c0(t) = t
t+1( 1t+1 )
t+ 1t+3, we have R∗ > pi(R¯). We know
pi(R) = R(1− F (R)) = R(1−Rt)
To find R¯, we need to maximize pi(R):
dpi
dR
= 1− (t+ 1)Rt = 0
Therefore,
R¯ = t
√
1
t+ 1
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Thus, pi(R¯) = R¯(1− R¯t) = t
√
1
t+1 (1− 1t+1 ). We get R∗ > pi(R¯) if and only if
t+1
√
(t+ 1)c(t) > t
√
1
t+ 1
(1− 1
t+ 1
) ⇐⇒ (t+ 1)c(t) > ( 1
t+ 1
)
t+1
t (
t
t+ 1
)t+1
⇐⇒ c(t) > 1
t+ 1
(
1
t+ 1
)
t+1
t (
t
t+ 1
)t+1
⇐⇒ c(t) > tt+1( 1
t+ 1
)t+
1
t+3
Let c0(t) = t
t+1( 1t+1 )
t+ 1t+3. Then, the proof of the first part of the proposition is complete. For the
second part of the proposition, we show that lim
t→0
c0(t) = 0. In the function c0(t), clearly, lim
t→0
tt+1 =
0. To find lim
t→0
(
1
t+ 1
)t+
1
t+3, we use L’ Hospital’s Rule for this purpose. Let y = (
1
t+ 1
)t+
1
t+3. We
first find lim
t→0
ln y:
lim
t→0
ln y = lim
t→0
(t+
1
t
+ 3) ln(
1
t+ 1
)
= lim
t→0
ln(
1
t+ 1
)
t
t2 + 3t+ 1
By L’ Hospital’s Rule we have
lim
t→0
ln y = lim
t→0
−1
t+ 1
1− t2
(t2 + 3t+ 1)2
= −1
Therefore, lim
t→0
y = e−1. This implies that lim
t→0
c0(t) = 0 · e−1 = 0.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
First we argue that Ri ≥ R∗(ti−1). As R∗(ti−1) is the maximum rate that will be accepted by all
the types in Ti, there is no need for the lender to offer below that. Now, to prove that there is
a type t˜ such that if ti ≥ t˜, then Ri ≤ R∗(ti), we show that there is a type t˜ such that if ti ≥ t˜,
then the expected payoff
∫ ti
ti−1
R(1 − Rt)µ(t)dt is decreasing for every R ≥ R∗(ti). For this aim,
by taking the first derivative of the expected payoff with respect to R we have
d
dR
∫ ti
ti−1
R(1−Rt)µ(t)dt =
∫ ti
ti−1
d
dR
R(1−Rt)µ(t)dt
=
∫ ti
ti−1
(1− (t+ 1)Rt)µ(t)dt
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If we show that 1− (t+ 1)Rt ≤ 0 for every t ∈ [ti−1, ti], then the above first derivative is negative
too. It is easy to see that the inequality 1−(t+1)Rt ≤ 0 is equivalent to the inequality R ≥ t
√
1
t+1 .
Now if we show that R∗(ti) ≥ ti
√
1
ti+1
, then we have R ≥ t
√
1
t+1 for every R ≥ R∗(ti) and every
t ∈ [ti−1, ti], because it can be verified that t
√
1
t+1 is strictly decreasing and continuous for every
t > 0. To this end, we write
R∗(ti) ≥ ti
√
1
ti + 1
⇔ ti+1
√
(ti + 1)c(ti) ≥ ti
√
1
ti + 1
⇔ c(ti) ≥ ( 1
ti + 1
)
2+ 1ti
One can check that the function ( 1t+1 )
2+ 1t is a strictly decreasing and continuous function for t > 0
with lim
t→0
(
1
t+ 1
)2+
1
t =
1
e
and lim
t→∞(
1
t+ 1
)2+
1
t = 0. Moreover, we know that the cost function c(t)
is an increasing function with c(0) < 1e according to our assumption. Therefore, there exists t˜ such
that for every t ≥ t˜ we have c(t) ≥ ( 1t+1 )2+
1
t . The graph below illustrates this. In the graph we
have c(t) = 0.01t2 + 0.02.
tt˜
1
e
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Table 1: Summary statistics for syndicated loan tranches
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of 21,855
syndicated loan tranches representing 4,718 firms from 2000
through 2015. A spread is considered to be rounded if it is a
multiple of 25 basis points above LIBOR.
Variable No of loans Mean Median SD
Firm characteristics
Unrated 21,855 0.41 0.00 0.49
No Ticker 21,855 0.06 0.00 0.24
Existing borrower 21,855 0.68 1.00 0.47
Lender characteristics
Top 5 lead arranger 21,855 0.47 0.00 0.50
Former arranger 21,855 0.31 0.00 0.46
Loan characteristics
Spread 21,855 207.31 175.00 148.50
Loan size 21,855 923.13 424.63 1738.08
Loan to sales ratio 21,855 8.21 0.33 121.10
Maturity in days 21,855 1458 1825 654
Tranche 21,855 0.30 0.00 0.46
Term loan 21,855 0.30 0.00 0.46
Covenant 21,855 0.22 0.00 0.41
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Table 2: Evidence of rounding of spreads
This table shows evidence of rounding of spreads over LIBOR by using logit regressions.
The marginal effect is reported in the top row and the z-statistic is reported in the bottom
row. In addition to the reported variables all regressions include year and industry dummies.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at both the borrower and the
lender level.
Dependent variable Rounded spread dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Unrated borrower 0.50 *** 0.50 *** 0.27 ***
(15.82) (9.75) (4.86)
Private borrower 0.31 *** 0.31 ** 0.27 **
(4.52) (2.30) (2.11)
Borrower size -0.30 ***
(-12.78)
Loan to sales ratio -0.01
(-0.73)
Tranche 0.30 ***
(5.88)
Term loan 1.37 ***
(21.54)
Year dummies no no no
Industry dummies no no no
Borrower and lender fixed effects no yes yes
Log pseudolikelihood -12,891.96 -12,891.96 -11,950.56
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.106 0.083
N 21,855 21,855 21,855
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level.
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Table 3: Evidence of rounding of spreads
This table shows evidence of rounding of spreads over LIBOR by using logit regressions.
The marginal effect is reported in the top row and the z-statistic is reported in the bottom
row. In addition to the reported variables all regressions include year and industry dummies.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at both the borrower and the
lender level.
Dependent variable Rounded spread dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Opaque borrower 0.32 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 ***
(5.52) (4.97) (4.94)
Existing borrower -0.28 *** -0.22 ***
(-4.78) (-3.45)
Former lender -0.14 **
(-2.10)
Borrower size -0.39 *** -0.38 *** -0.38 ***
(-15.31) (-14.79) (-14.80)
Loan to sales ratio -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(-1.32) (-1.43) (-1.46)
Tranche 0.34 *** 0.33 *** 0.33 ***
(6.57) (6.41) (6.37)
Term loan 1.22 *** 1.22 *** 1.22 ***
(18.90) (18.96) (18.89)
Ln(maturity) 0.40 *** 0.39 *** 0.39 ***
(10.22) (9.98) (9.92)
Covenant 0.22 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 ***
(2.88) (2.65) (2.60)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Borrower and lender fixed effects yes yes yes
Log pseudolikelihood -10,772.36 -10,746.45 -10,741.10
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.175 0.176
N 21,855 21,855 21,855
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level.
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Table 5: Evidence of upward rounding of spreads
This table shows evidence of upward rounding of spreads over LIBOR by using
OLS regression. For each independent variable, the coefficient is reported in
the top row and the t-statistic is reported in the bottom row. In addition
to the reported variables all regressions include year and industry dummies.
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the borrower
and the lender level.
Dependent variable Spread above LIBOR
(1) (2)
Rounded spread 125.38 *** 104.57 ***
(47.20) (43.15)
RatingB 73.97 *** 57.75 ***
(22.46) (19.30)
RatingC 218.60 *** 189.73 ***
(9.66) (9.41)
RatingD 225.92 *** 201.26 ***
(11.97) (11.23)
Unrated borrower 62.54 *** 50.40 ***
(16.14) (14.35)
Borrower size -11.09 *** -14.89 ***
(-8.76) (-12.71)
Loan to sales ratio 1.16 * 0.47
(1.91) (0.95)
Tranche 15.8
(6.19)
Term loan 85.27 ***
(28.52)
Ln(maturity) 2.29 ***
(0.98)
Covenant -1.87
(-0.55)
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Borrower and lender fixed effects yes yes
R2 0.362 0.436
N 21,855 21,855
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1%
level
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Table 6: Unobserved credit risk is not related to rounding
This table shows evidence that unobserved credit risk is not related to round-
ing of spreads over LIBOR by using logit regressions. The marginal effect
is reported in the top row and the z-statistic is reported in the bottom row.
In addition to the reported variables all regressions include year and industry
dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the
borrower and the lender level.
Dependent variable Spread above LIBOR
(1) (2)
Opaque borrower 0.25 *** 0.29 ***
(4.25) (4.94)
Residual 0.00 0.00
(-0.04) (0.72)
Existing borrower -0.25 *** -0.22 ***
(-3.88) (-3.44)
Former lender -0.22 *** -0.14 **
(-3.19) (-2.09)
Borrower size -0.32 *** -0.38 ***
(-12.34) (-14.83)
Loan to sales ratio -0.01 -0.02
(-0.56) (-1.46)
Tranche 0.33 ***
(6.38)
Term loan 1.22 ***
(18.84)
Ln(maturity) 0.39 ***
(9.93)
Covenant 0.19 ***
(2.59)
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Borrower and lender fixed effects yes yes
Log pseudolikelihood -11,536.55 -10,740.54
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.176
N 21,855 21,855
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1%
level
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Table 7: Intertemporal changes in spread over LIBOR
This table shows intertemporal changes in spreads over LIBOR by us-
ing OLS regression. For each independent variable, the coefficient is
reported in the top row and the t-statistic is reported in the bottom
row. In addition to the reported variables all regressions include year
and industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust
and clustered at the borrower and the lender level.
Dependent variable Spread above LIBOR
(1) (2)
Subsample Subsample
from 2000 from 2009
to 2005 to 2015
Rounded spread 118.66 *** 87.12 ***
(27.22) (27.39)
RatingB 44.56 *** 74.49 ***
(10.02) (17.51)
RatingC 147.97 *** 210.76 ***
(4.10) (7.71)
RatingD 130.69 *** 302.36 ***
(9.17) (8.42)
Unrated borrower 35.61 *** 62.73 ***
(7.06) (12.31)
Borrower size -10.88 *** -20.74 ***
(-5.75) (-12.40)
Loan to sales ratio 1.77 0.55
(0.80) (1.05)
Tranche 7.41 23.43 ***
(1.48) (6.80)
Term loan 76.41 *** 95.47 ***
(13.34) (23.78)
Ln(maturity) 8.33 ** -1.65
(2.39) (-0.38)
Covenant 10.03 ** -32.02 ***
(2.34) (-5.84)
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Borrower and lender fixed effects yes yes
R2 0.505 0.352
N 8,915 9,685
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at
1% level
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Table 8: Level of rounded spread over different ranges of spread over LIBOR
This table shows level of rounded spread over different ranges of spread over LIBOR by using OLS
regression. For each independent variable, the coefficient is reported in the top row and the t-
statistic is reported in the bottom row. In addition to the reported variables all regressions include
year and industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the
borrower and the lender level.
Dependent variable Spread above LIBOR
(1) (2) (3)
Subsample with Subsample with Subsample with
spread over LIBOR spread over LIBOR spread over LIBOR
from 0 to 99 from 100 to 199 above 199
Rounded spread 8.03 *** 8.24 *** 22.55 ***
(7.71) (8.27) (2.91)
RatingB 22.49 *** 21.43 *** 28.47 ***
(19.27) (11.12) (2.75)
RatingC 3.45 34.66 *** 135.97 ***
(0.28) (4.84) (5.78)
RatingD 122.32 ***
(5.76)
Unrated borrower 15.24 *** 22.36 *** 30.20 ***
(11.49) (11.00) (2.89)
Borrower size -4.29 *** -1.40 *** -10.18 ***
(-8.78) (-3.03) (-5.76)
Loan to sales ratio 0.51 ** 0.25 -0.21
(2.21) (0.77) (-0.39)
Tranche -0.16 3.47 *** 7.58 **
(-0.16) (3.86) (2.05)
Term loan 6.81 *** 7.50 *** 72.46 ***
(3.60) (7.83) (18.64)
Ln(maturity) 1.92 *** 1.49 * -18.25 ***
(3.22) (1.95) (-4.57)
Covenant 4.32 *** 0.96 -22.66 ***
(3.18) (0.71) (-4.21)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Borrower and lender fixed effects yes yes yes
R2 0.415 0.123 0.147
N 4,763 6,742 10,350
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level
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Table 10: Interest rate clustering before, during and after the financial crisis
This table shows evidence of rounding of spreads over LIBOR before, during and after the
financial crisis by using logit regressions. The marginal effect is reported in the top row
and the z-statistic is reported in the bottom row. In addition to the reported variables
all regressions include year and industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust and clustered at both the borrower and lender level.
Dependent variable Rounded spread dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Subsample from Subsample from Subsample from
2000 to 2007 2008 to 2010 2011 to 2015
Opaque borrower 0.35 *** 0.55 *** 0.23 ***
(4.38) (3.17) (2.66)
Borrower size -0.43 *** -0.39 *** -0.32 ***
(-11.65) (-4.81) (-9.30)
Loan to sales ratio -0.05 -0.05 -0.01
(-1.16) (-0.62) (-0.58)
Tranche -0.06 0.62 *** 0.62 ***
(-0.77) (3.27) (8.28)
Term loan 1.91 *** 0.70 *** 0.74 ***
(16.04) (3.95) (9.57)
Ln(maturity) 0.60 *** 0.33 *** -0.11
(10.83) (2.94) (-1.50)
Covenant 0.27 *** 0.00 -0.19
(2.98) 0.00 (-1.57)
Year dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Borrower and lender fixed effects yes yes yes
Log pseudolikelihood -6,083.34 -893.72 -3,570.39
Pseudo R2 0.181 0.137 0.122
N 11,224 2,521 8,093
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level.
38
Page 39 of 41
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Table 11: Evidence against tacit collusion hypothesis
This table shows evidence against tacit collusion hypothesis by using logit re-
gressions. The marginal effect is reported in the top row and the z-statistic is
reported in the bottom row. In addition to the reported variables all regressions
include year and industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity ro-
bust and clustered at both the borrower and the lender level.
Dependent variable Spread above LIBOR
(1) (2)
Opaque borrower 0.28 *** 0.28 ***
(4.74) (4.73)
Top 5 lead arranger -0.32 *** -0.31 ***
(-5.37) (-5.19)
Existing borrower -0.27 *** -0.24 ***
(-4.63) (-3.76)
Former lender -0.07
(-1.04)
Borrower size -0.37 *** -0.37 ***
(-14.51) (-14.52)
Loan to sales ratio -0.03 -0.03
(-1.49) (-1.50)
Tranche 0.32 *** 0.32 ***
-6.21 -6.19
Term loan 1.19 *** 1.19 ***
(18.46) (18.44)
Ln(maturity) 0.4 *** 0.39 ***
(9.97) (9.95)
Covenant 0.13 * 0.13 *
(1.75) (1.76)
Year dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
Borrower and lender fixed effects yes yes
Log pseudolikelihood -10,704.64 -10,703.37
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.179
N 21,855 21,855
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1%
level
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